How to construct random functions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
How to construct pseudorandom permutations from pseudorandom functions
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
Authentication and authenticated key exchanges
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
A Pseudorandom Generator from any One-way Function
SIAM Journal on Computing
Security Amplification by Composition: The Case of Doubly-Iterated, Ideal Ciphers
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Data remanence in semiconductor devices
SSYM'01 Proceedings of the 10th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 10
Secure coprocessors in electronic commerce applications
WOEC'95 Proceedings of the 1st conference on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1
Secure deletion of data from magnetic and solid-state memory
SSYM'96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - Volume 6
SSYM'96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - Volume 6
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Protecting secret data from insider attacks
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Improved topology assumptions for threshold cryptography in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Recovering data from USB flash memory sticks that have been damaged or electronically erased
Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Forensic applications and techniques in telecommunications, information, and multimedia and workshop
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We study cryptographic modeling and encryption-based design techniques for guaranteeing privacy of data that is first stored in some type of computer memory and then deleted. We continue the investigation started in [3] by presenting an enhanced privacy notion that captures practical scenarios of adversaries repeatedly and adaptively attacking the memory to inspect its entire content before trying to obtain information about deleted data. We prove that the new notion is strictly stronger than the previous one considered in [3] (allowing the adversary a single intrusion), and show then that the efficient protocol in [3] still satisfies the new notion. One question implicitly raised by the previous work was whether it is indeed possible to define one meaningful and applicable notion of security even against adversaries that can repeatedly and adaptively obtain total control of the memory. Perhaps unexpectedly, our paper affirmatively answers this question.