An algorithmic framework for performing collaborative filtering
Proceedings of the 22nd annual international ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in information retrieval
Item-based collaborative filtering recommendation algorithms
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Evaluating collaborative filtering recommender systems
ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS)
Shilling recommender systems for fun and profit
Proceedings of the 13th international conference on World Wide Web
Collaborative recommendation: A robustness analysis
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Analysis of a low-dimensional linear model under recommendation attacks
SIGIR '06 Proceedings of the 29th annual international ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in information retrieval
Classification features for attack detection in collaborative recommender systems
Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Attack detection in time series for recommender systems
Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Detecting profile injection attacks in collaborative filtering: a classification-based approach
WebKDD'06 Proceedings of the 8th Knowledge discovery on the web international conference on Advances in web mining and web usage analysis
Dependable filtering: Philosophy and realizations
ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS)
HySAD: a semi-supervised hybrid shilling attack detector for trustworthy product recommendation
Proceedings of the 18th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining
Robustness analysis of privacy-preserving model-based recommendation schemes
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
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Significant vulnerabilities have recently been identi- fied in collaborative filtering recommender systems. Researchers have shown that attackers can manipulate a system's recommendations by injecting biased profiles into it. In this paper, we examine attacks that concentrate on a targeted set of users with similar tastes, biasing the system's responses to these users. We show that such attacks are both pragmatically reasonable and also highly effective against both user-based and item-based algorithms. As a result, an attacker can mount such a "segmented" attack with little knowledge of the specific system being targeted and with strong likelihood of success.