Infinite Player Noncooperative Games with Vector Payoffs Under Relative Pseudomonotonicity

  • Authors:
  • E. Allevi;A. Gnudi;I. V. Konnov;S. Schaible

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Quantitative Methods, Brescia University, Brescia, Italy 25122;Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Informatics and Applications, Bergamo University, Bergamo, Italy 24127;Department of Applied Mathematics, Kazan University, Kazan, Russia 420008;A.G.Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Riverside, USA 92521

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Global Optimization
  • Year:
  • 2006

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In this paper we consider the Nash equilibrium problem for infinite player games with vector payoffs in a topological vector space setting. By employing new concepts of relative (pseudo)monotonicity, we establish several existence results of solutions for usual and normalized vector equilibria. The results strengthen existence results for vector equilibrium problems, which were based on classical pseudomonotonicity concepts. They also extend previous results for vector variational inequalities and finite player games under relative (pseudo)monotonicity.