Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Modeling and performance analysis of BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer networks
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
A case for taxation in peer-to-peer streaming broadcast
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
The bittorrent p2p file-sharing system: measurements and analysis
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
The design trade-offs of BitTorrent-like file sharing protocols
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
| Hi-index | 0.01 |
Tit-for-tat style file sharing systems such as BitTorrent have proven to be remarkably effective in dealing with highly popular content. By explicitly addressing free-riding behavior, a "greedy" tit-for-tat approach encourages sharing and succeeds in providing a higher quality of service. However, in situations where a file is not as popular, or the rate of demand is not high, it is frequently difficult to obtain the file in a timely manner. In this paper we demonstrate how additionally greedy behavior on the part of some peers can counterintuitively address this problem. In particular we discuss two possible techniques by which peers, with complete file copies, strategically reduce their effort while improving total network performance by various metrics.