How to construct pseudorandom permutations from pseudorandom functions
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
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Designs, Codes and Cryptography - Special issue: selected areas in cryptography I
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
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FSE '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
On the Construction of Pseudo-Random Permutations: Luby-Rackoff Revisited
On the Construction of Pseudo-Random Permutations: Luby-Rackoff Revisited
Generic Attacks on Feistel Networks with Internal Permutations
AFRICACRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Cryptology in Africa: Progress in Cryptology
On Lai---Massey and quasi-Feistel ciphers
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
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Information Processing Letters
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In this paper we are dealing with the security of the Feistel structure in the Luby---Rackoff model when the round functions are replaced by permutations. There is a priori no reason to think that the security bounds remain the same in this case, as illustrated by Knudsen's attack [5]. It is why we revisit Luby---Rackoff's proofs [6] in this specific case. The conclusion is that when the inner functions are random permutations, a 3-round (resp. 4-round) Feistel scheme remains secure against pseudorandom (resp. superpseudorandom) distinguishers as long as m 2n/2 (with m the number of queries and 2n the block size).