Perfectly one-way probabilistic hash functions (preliminary version)
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Towards Realizing Random Oracles: Hash Functions That Hide All Partial Information
CRYPTO '97 Proceedings of the 17th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
All-or-Nothing Encryption and the Package Transform
FSE '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Time-lock Puzzles and Timed-release Crypto
Time-lock Puzzles and Timed-release Crypto
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 2, Basic Applications
Conditional oblivious transfer and timed-release encryption
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
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Imagine there is certain content we want to maintain private until some particular event occurs, when we want to have it automatically disclosed. Suppose, furthermore, that we want this done in a (possibly) malicious host. Say the confidential content is a piece of code belonging to a computer program that should remain ciphered and then “be triggered” (i.e., deciphered and executed) when the underlying system satisfies a preselected condition, which must remain secret after code inspection. In this work we present different solutions for problems of this sort, using different “declassification” criteria, based on a primitive we call secure triggers. We establish the notion of secure triggers in the universally composable security framework of Canetti [2001] and introduce several examples. Our examples demonstrate that a new sort of obfuscation is possible. Finally, we motivate its use with applications in realistic scenarios.