Secure multicast routing in wireless networks
ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review
Timing-based localization of in-band wormhole tunnels in MANETs
Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Wireless network security
CARRADS: Cross layer based adaptive real-time routing attack detection system for MANETS
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Robust Decentralized Virtual Coordinate Systems in Adversarial Environments
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
MILCOM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE conference on Military communications
Dynamics of learning algorithms for the on-demand secure byzantine routing protocol
ESAS'06 Proceedings of the Third European conference on Security and Privacy in Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks
Enhanced dynamic source routing protocol for mitigating black hole attack
International Journal of Wireless and Mobile Computing
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Survivable routing protocols are able to provide service in the presence of attacks and failures. The strongest attacks that protocols can experience are attacks where adversaries have full control of a number of authenticated nodes that behave arbitrarily to disrupt the network, also referred to as Byzantine attacks. This work examines the survivability of ad hoc wireless routing protocols in the presence of several Byzantine attacks: black holes, flood rushing, wormholes and overlay network wormholes. Traditional secure routing protocols that assume authenticated nodes can always be trusted, fail to defend against such attacks. Our protocol, ODSBR, is an on-demand wireless routing protocol able to provide correct service in the presence of failures and Byzantine attacks. We demonstrate through simulation its effectiveness in mitigating such attacks. Our analysis of the impact of these attacks versus the adversary's effort gives insights into their relative strengths, their interaction and their importance when designing wireless routing protocols.