Zero-knowledge undeniable signatures (extended abstract)
EUROCRYPT '90 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Secret Handshakes from Pairing-Based Key Agreements
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Oblivious signature-based envelope
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Proceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society
Concealing complex policies with hidden credentials
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
k-anonymous secret handshakes with reusable credentials
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Designated verifier proofs and their applications
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Universal designated verifier signature proof (or how to efficiently prove knowledge of a signature)
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Designated verifier signatures: anonymity and efficient construction from any bilinear map
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
Optimistic fair exchange of digital signatures
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
Three-round secret handshakes based on elgamal and DSA
ISPEC'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
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Consider a situation where a secret agent wants to authenticate herself to the other secret agents. This secret agent must be able to convince the others of her identity. She cannot convince any other people other than those predetermined secret agents. This is to avoid problems that might occur if this secret agent would like to 'betray' her group. On the whole we would like to allow the agent to convince a predetermined group of people by showing that she holds a credential and so she is a member of the group. However we would like to prohibit this agent from convincing any other people outside the group. We also need to ensure that the party who has been convinced by the credential cannot use this information to convince any third party. We call this type of scheme as Designated Group Credential. In this paper, we first show a model of designated group credential systems followed by an efficient construction based on pairing-based cryptography. We also provide security proof of our scheme based on the random oracle model.