CCS '99 Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition
Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition
Secure smartcardbased fingerprint authentication
WBMA '03 Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMM workshop on Biometrics methods and applications
Reusable cryptographic fuzzy extractors
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
New shielding functions to enhance privacy and prevent misuse of biometric templates
AVBPA'03 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Audio- and video-based biometric person authentication
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
KES '07 Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems and the XVII Italian Workshop on Neural Networks on Proceedings of the 11th International Conference
Bipartite Biotokens: Definition, Implementation, and Analysis
ICB '09 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Advances in Biometrics
Security-Enhanced Fuzzy Fingerprint Vault Based on Minutiae's Local Ridge Information
ICB '09 Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Advances in Biometrics
Secure sketch for multiple secrets
ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Hiding secret points amidst chaff
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Robust extraction of secret bits from minutiae
ICB'07 Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Advances in Biometrics
Biometric encryption based on a fuzzy vault scheme with a fast chaff generation algorithm
Future Generation Computer Systems
A dissection of fingerprint fuzzy vault schemes
Proceedings of the 27th Conference on Image and Vision Computing New Zealand
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In biometric identification, a fingerprint is typically represented as a set of minutiae which are 2D points. A method [4] to protect the fingerprint template hides the minutiae by adding random points (known as chaff) into the original point set. The chaff points are added one-by-one, constrained by the requirement that no two points are close to each other, until it is impossible to add more points or sufficient number of points have been added. Therefore, if the original template consists of s points, and the total number of chaff points and the original points is m, then a brute-force attacker is expected to examine half of m chooses s possibilities to find the original. The chaff generated seem to be "random", especially if the minutiae are also randomly generated in the same manner. Indeed, the number of searches required by the brute-force attacker has been used to measure the security of the method. In this paper, we give an observation which leads to a way to distinguish the minutiae from the chaff. Extensive simulations show that our attacker can find the original better than brute-force search. For e.g. when s = 1 and the number of chaff points is expected to be about 313, our attacker on average takes about 100 searches. Our results highlight the need to adopt a more rigorous notion of security for template protection. We also give an empirical lower bound of the entropy loss due to the sketch.