Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Understanding BGP misconfiguration
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing
SIAM Journal on Computing
Detection of Invalid Routing Announcement in the Internet
DSN '02 Proceedings of the 2002 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Practical Techniques for Searches on Encrypted Data
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
SPV: secure path vector routing for securing BGP
Proceedings of the 2004 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Concealing complex policies with hidden credentials
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Listen and whisper: security mechanisms for BGP
NSDI'04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation - Volume 1
Public key encryption with conjunctive field keyword search
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
Searchable encryption revisited: consistency properties, relation to anonymous IBE, and extensions
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Keychain-based signatures for securing BGP
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications - Special issue title on scaling the internet routing system: an interim report
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The current Internet has no secure way to validate the correctness of the routing information. We suggest a mechanism that supports secure validation of routing information in the interdomain routing protocol of the Internet. Our mechanism focuses on alleviating obstacles which previously prevent the complete and correct construction of the Internet routing information. In particular, we propose an identity-based Registry with Authorized and Verifiable Search (RAVS) so that routing information can be constructed securely. We construct an efficient RAVS scheme and prove its securities in the random oracle model. By our scheme, the routing information can be securely stored and tested without revealing contents of both the registry and the search query. Furthermore, our registry is verifiable and its correctness is guaranteed. Only the legal autonomous system (AS) can construct the valid registry and the single compromised AS can be detected. Our experiment shows that our RAVS scheme can be implemented efficiently and the incurred overhead, in terms of time and space, is acceptable in practice.