Forgery attack on the RPC incremental unforgeable encryption scheme

Authors:
Chuan Chi Wang;Min-Chih Kao;Yi-Shiung Yeh
Affiliations:
CSIE of Ching-Yun University, Jung-Li, Taiwan, R.O.C.;CSIE of National Chiao-Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan, R.O.C.;CSIE of National Chiao-Tung University, Hsinchu Taiwan, R.O.C.
Venue:
ASIACCS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Year:
2006

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Abstract

We show a chosen plaintext attack against the RPC incremental unforgeable encryption scheme. The attack can forge a valid ciphertext efficiently. When Applying to 128-bit block RPC scheme, by the concept of birthday paradox, a forgery ciphertext can be gotten after 224 queries with probability larger than 1/2.