Using Stochastic Game Theory to Compute the Expected Behavior of Attackers

Authors:
K. Sallhammar;S. J. Knapskog;B. E. Helvik
Affiliations:
Norwegian University of Science and Technology;Norwegian University of Science and Technology;Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Venue:
SAINT-W '05 Proceedings of the 2005 Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops
Year:
2005

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Abstract

This paper presents ongoing work on using stochastic game theory as a mathematical tool for computing the expected behavior of attackers. The possible use of the Nash Equilibrium as a part of the transition probabilities in state transition models is defined and motivated. To demonstrate the approach, a simple example of an attack against a computer network is modelled and analyzed.