Randomized Intrusion-Tolerant Asynchronous Services

Authors:
Henrique Moniz;Nuno Ferreira Neves;Miguel Correia;Paulo Verissimo
Affiliations:
University of Lisboa, Portugal;University of Lisboa, Portugal;University of Lisboa, Portugal;University of Lisboa, Portugal
Venue:
DSN '06 Proceedings of the International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Year:
2006

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Abstract

Randomized agreement protocols have been around for more than two decades. Often assumed to be inefficient due to their high expected communication and time complexities, they have remained largely overlooked by the community-at-large as a valid solution for the deployment of fault-tolerant distributed systems. This paper aims to demonstrate that randomization can be a very competitive approach even in hostile environments where arbitrary faults can occur. A stack of randomized intrusion-tolerant protocols is described and its performance evaluated under different faultloads. The stack provides a set of relevant services ranging from basic communication primitives up to atomic broadcast. The experimental evaluation shows that the protocols are efficient and no performance reduction is observed under certain Byzantine faults.