Pricing in computer networks: motivation, formulation, and example
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Internet Economics
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Network-Optimized Road Pricing: Part I: a Parable and a Model
Operations Research
Network-Optimized Road Pricing: Part II: Algorithms and Examples
Operations Research
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On Certain Connectivity Properties of the Internet Topology
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
A stronger bound on Braess's Paradox
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Edge Pricing of Multicommodity Networks for Heterogeneous Selfish Users
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Tolls for Heterogeneous Selfish Users in Multicommodity Networks and Generalized Congestion Games
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A survey on networking games in telecommunications
Computers and Operations Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Braess's paradox, fibonacci numbers, and exponential inapproximability
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Pricing congestible network resources
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Improving the Efficiency of Load Balancing Games through Taxes
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Stabilization of the minimum latency flow in Braess graphs by state-dependent tax
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Bio-Inspired Models of Network, Information and Computing Sytems
Efficient Methods for Selfish Network Design
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
Theoretical Computer Science
Eliciting Coordination with Rebates
Transportation Science
Price war in heterogeneous wireless networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Improving the price of anarchy for selfish routing via coordination mechanisms
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Efficiency of restricted tolls in non-atomic network routing games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Efficient methods for selfish network design
Theoretical Computer Science
The effectiveness of stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Inefficiency of Nash equilibria with parallel processing policy
Information Processing Letters
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We study economic incentives for influencing selfish behavior in networks. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to selfishly route traffic on minimum-latency paths. The quality of a routing of traffic is historically measured by the sum of all travel times, also called the total latency. It is well known that the outcome of selfish routing (a flow at Nash equilibrium) does not minimize the total latency, and that marginal cost pricing-charging each network user for the congestion effects caused by its presence-eliminates the inefficiency of selfish routing. However, the principle of marginal cost pricing assumes that taxes cause no disutility to network users; this is appropriate only when collected taxes can be feasibly returned (directly or indirectly) to the users. If this assumption does not hold and we wish to minimize the total user disutility (latency plus taxes paid)-the total cost-how should we price the network edges? Intuition may suggest that taxes can never improve the cost of a Nash equilibrium, but the famous Braess's Paradox shows this intuition to be incorrect. We consider strategies for pricing network edges to reduce the cost of a Nash equilibrium. Since levying a sufficiently large tax on an edge effectively removes it from the network, our study generalizes previous work on designing networks for selfish users [T. Roughgarden, Designing networks for selfish users is hard, in: Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2001, pp. 472-481 (full version to appear in Journal of Computer and System Sciences)]. In this paper, we prove the following results.*In a large class of networks-including all networks with linear latency functions-marginal cost taxes do not improve the cost of a Nash equilibrium. *The largest-possible benefit from taxes does not exceed that from edge removals. In every network with linear latency functions, the benefit of taxes cannot exceed that of removing edges. There are networks with nonlinear latency functions, however, in which taxes are radically more powerful than edge removals. *For every @e0, there is no (43-@e)-approximation algorithm for computing optimal taxes, even in networks with linear latency functions (assuming PNP).