High-order punishment and the evolution of cooperation

  • Authors:

  • Bastian Baranski;Thomas Bartz-Beielstein;Rüdiger Ehlers;Thusinthan Kajendran;Björn Kosslers;Jörn Mehnen;Tomasz Polaszek;Ralf Reimholz;Jens Schmidt;Karlheinz Schmitt;Danny Seis;Rafael Slodzinski;Simon Steeg;Nils Wiemann;Marc Zimmermann

  • Affiliations:

  • Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany;Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 8th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Goods Game are models to study mechanisms leading to the evolution of cooperation. From a simplified rational and egoistic perspective there should be no altruistic cooperation in these games at all. Previous studies observed circumstances under which cooperation can emerge. This paper demonstrates that high-order punishment opportunities can maintain a higher cooperation level in an agent based simulation of the evolution of cooperation.