A review of current defeasible reasoning implementations
The Knowledge Engineering Review
An algorithm to compute minimally grounded and admissible defence sets in argument systems
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2006
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Traditionally, computer scientists have considered computational problems and algorithms as artificial formal objects that can be studied theoretically. In this work we propose a different view of algorithms as natural phenomena that can be studied using empirical methods. In the first part, we propose a methodology for using machine learning techniques to create accurate statistical models of running times of a given algorithm on particular problem instances. Rather than focus on the traditional aggregate notions of hardness, such as worst-case or average-case complexity, these models provide a much more comprehensive picture of algorithms' performance. We demonstrate that such models can indeed be constructed for two notoriously hard domains: winner determination problem for combinatorial auctions and satisfiability of Boolean formulae. In both cases the models can be analyzed to shed light on the characteristics of these problems that make them hard. We also demonstrate two concrete applications of empirical hardness models. First, these models can be used to construct efficient algorithm portfolios that select correct algorithm on a per-instance basis. Second, the models can be used to induce harder benchmarks. In the second part of this work we take a more traditional view of an algorithm as a tool for studying the underlying problem. We consider a very challenging problem of finding a sample Nash equilibrium (NE) of a normal-form game. For this domain, we first present a novel benchmark suite that is more representative of the problem than traditionally-used random games. We also present a very simple search algorithm for finding NEs. The simplicity of that algorithm allows us to draw interesting conclusions about the underlying nature of the problem based on its empirical performance. In particular, we conclude that most structured games of interest have either pure-strategy equilibria or equilibria with very small supports.