Pricing computer services: queueing effects
Communications of the ACM
Dynamic control structures for cooperating processes
Dynamic control structures for cooperating processes
Mathematical modeling and Ada simulation of some synchronization processes
ANSS '87 Proceedings of the 20th annual symposium on Simulation
Simulation of a market model for distributed control
ANSS '88 Proceedings of the 21st annual symposium on Simulation
The simulation of a distributed control model for resource allocation and the implied pricing
ANSS '89 Proceedings of the 22nd annual symposium on Simulation
Parallel Computers Two: Architecture, Programming and Algorithms
Parallel Computers Two: Architecture, Programming and Algorithms
Multitasking simulation of a boiler system using qualitative model-based reasoning
ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation (TOMACS)
Auction allocation of computing resources
Communications of the ACM
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Modifying our previously developed simulation model [FRA89], we study in this paper the costs associated with distributed allocation of computing resources in a multitasking environment. Using funds endowed upon arrival, computing tasks compete for necessary resources through sealed-bid auctions to improve their processing schedules. The costs and times dedicated to auctioning are compared to the costs and times allowed for task processing. Measuring computing resources in terms of processing rates allows the task management, in the form of an auction, algorithm, to have its requirements specified in the same way as the requirements for the simulated mission processing. Machine capacity is computed for and assigned to each completing task. Data are then compiled by segmented capacity classes. A unifying theme of past and current research is the efficiency of auctioning to allocate reconfigurable computing resources in a variable capacity machine. We observed that at optimal rates of occurrence of capacity classes which minimize the total costs per successful completion, congestion was resolved through auctions generating endogenously implied prices which substantially exceeded the exogenously imposed price.