A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P Systems
P2P '03 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing
Exchange-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
ICDCS '04 Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS'04)
Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentives for content availability in memory-less peer-to-peer file sharing systems
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Incentives for large peer-to-peer systems
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Cooperating with free riders in unstructured P2P networks
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
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In this paper we focus on content availability as the main good provided by a p2p file sharing system and consider peer availability, the amount of time peers stay connected sharing their files, as their main contribution. We wish to study the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms which enforce contribution by somehow relating it with consumption. Towards this end, we propose a mechanism who wishes to regulate the time required for peers to stay on-line sharing their files by dictating a fixed upload throughput used by uploading peers and thus a certain average time for a download to finish. We formulate and analyze a suitable economic model focusing on peer availability in order to understand the role of this important system parameter and provide the means to efficiently tune it.