Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs
MobiHoc '00 Proceedings of the 1st ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Core: a collaborative reputation mechanism to enforce node cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Sixth Joint Working Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security: Advanced Communications and Multimedia Security
A charging and rewarding scheme for packet forwarding in multi-hop cellular networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing
Two-hop-relay architecture for next-generation WWAN/WLAN integration
IEEE Wireless Communications
CDMA/HDR: a bandwidth efficient high speed wireless data service for nomadic users
IEEE Communications Magazine
Secure incentives for commercial ad dissemination in vehicular networks
Proceedings of the 8th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Dynamic reputation-based incentive mechanism considering heterogeneous networks
Proceedings of the 3nd ACM workshop on Performance monitoring and measurement of heterogeneous wireless and wired networks
Incentives for Cooperative Relay in Heterogeneous Networks: A Dynamic Reputation-Based Approach
APNOMS '08 Proceedings of the 11th Asia-Pacific Symposium on Network Operations and Management: Challenges for Next Generation Network Operations and Service Management
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Non-cooperative behaviors in communication networks can significantly adversely affect the entire network. Recently, researchers have begun to study such non-cooperative communication systems within a game theory framework and strive to engineer the system to prevent performance degradation under non-cooperative behaviors. The WWAN/WLAN two-hop-relay system described in [1] integrates two types of wireless technologies to improve wireless access throughput and coverage. The relay nodes in the two-hop-relay system can be wireless relay routers deployed by wireless service providers, or dual-mode users who voluntarily relay traffic for other users. However, it is reasonable to assume that all dual-mode terminals are selfish and are not willing to relay for other users without an incentive. In this paper, we will use the basic concepts of game theory, especially the concept of the Nash Equilibrium, to design our scheduling algorithms. Several scheduling algorithms, including the maximum rate C/I scheduler, the proportional fair scheduler, and the round robin scheduler, are examined to understand performance while operating under the assumption that all users are selfish. Under the C/I scheduler or the proportional fair scheduler, Nash Equilibriums exist at the operating points where no user will relay for other users--an undesirable situation. Under the round robin scheduler, selfish users are indifferent on relaying voluntarily or not relaying. Therefore, we are inspired to design a novel incentive scheduler. By applying the proposed incentive scheduler, all selfish users relay cooperatively at the Nash Equilibrium.