Negotiation and cooperation in multi-agent environments
Artificial Intelligence - Special issue on economic principles of multi-agent systems
A coalition formation mechanism based on inter-agent trust relationships
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Dynamic Coalition Formation among Rational Agents
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Coalition formation in proportionally fair divisible auctions
AAMAS '03 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Organization-Based Coalition Formation
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
A Multi-Agent Framework for Conflict Analysis and Negotiation: Case of COTS Selection
IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems
Qualitative reasoning model for tradeoff analysis
MDAI'05 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence
Searching for agent coalition using particle swarm optimization and death penalty function
ICIC'07 Proceedings of the intelligent computing 3rd international conference on Advanced intelligent computing theories and applications
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In Group-Choice Decision Making (GCDM) where a number of stakeholders are involved in choosing a single solution from a set of available solution options, it is common for the stakeholders to form coalitions during negotiations in order to increase their individual welfare. It is also common to use Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) to automate GCDM processes. In such MAS, agents have to form coalitions like their human counterparts. Within each coalition, the individual agents behave according to the strategies of their clients. In this paper we present a coalition formation model which can employ multiple coalition formation algorithms. The model is motivated by a real-world group-choice multi-agent system that we developed; in the system, agents can form coalitions dynamically based on the similarity between their preferences, and based on the ownership criteria. Finally, this paper presents simulation results that illustrate the operational effectiveness of our coalition formation model.