Sequential auctions for objects with common and private values
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Sequential versus simultaneous auctions: a case study
ICEC '06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet
Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
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This paper compares the sequential and simultaneous auctions for the following scenario. There are multiple similar objects for sale, each object is sold in a separate auction, and each bidder needs only one object. We use English auction rules and first determine equilibrium bidding strategies for the simultaneous and sequential cases. We do this for both common and private value objects by treating a bidder's information about these values as uncertain. We then consider the case where the private and common values have a uniform distribution and compare the two mechanisms in terms of three key properties: a bidder's ex-ante expected profit, the auctioneer's expected cumulative revenue, and the total expected surplus. For both common and private value objects, our study shows the following result. The expected cumulative revenue and the expected total surplus is higher for the sequential mechanism. However, a bidder's ex-ante expected profit depends on the number of objects being auctioned and the number of participating bidders, and it is sometimes higher for the sequential mechanism and sometimes for the simultaneous one.