Fair cost-sharing methods for the minimum spanning tree game

  • Authors:

  • Eric Angel;Evripidis Bampis;Lélia Blin;Laurent Gourvès

  • Affiliations:

  • IBISC, Université d'Évry, Évry cedex, France;IBISC, Université d'Évry, Évry cedex, France;IBISC, Université d'Évry, Évry cedex, France;IBISC, Université d'Évry, Évry cedex, France

  • Venue:
  • Information Processing Letters
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We study the problem of sharing in a fair manner the cost of a service provided to a set of players in the context of Cooperative Game Theory. We introduce a new fairness measure capturing the dissatisfaction (or happiness) of each player and we propose two cost sharing methods minimizing the maximum or average dissatisfaction of the clients for the classical minimum spanning tree game.