Timing channels, anonymity, mixes, and spikes

Authors:
Ira S. Moskowitz;Richard E. Newman
Affiliations:
Center for High Assurance Computer Systems, Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC;CISE DEpartment, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL
Venue:
ACST'06 Proceedings of the 2nd IASTED international conference on Advances in computer science and technology
Year:
2006

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Abstract

In this paper we consider how timing channels (from high assurance computing) arise in the study of certain anonymity systems. We then discuss how the same type of Shannon analysis for these timing channels applies to spikes (action potentials in the field of neuroscience).