Provably secure non-interactive key distribution based on pairings

  • Authors:
  • Régis Dupont;Andreas Enge

  • Affiliations:
  • Projet TANC, INRIA Futurs & Laboratoire d'Informatique, ÉÉcole polytechnique, Palaiseau Cedex, France;Projet TANC, INRIA Futurs & Laboratoire d'Informatique, ÉÉcole polytechnique, Palaiseau Cedex, France

  • Venue:
  • Discrete Applied Mathematics - Special issue: Coding and cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We define a security notion for non-interactive key distribution protocols. We identify an apparently hard computational problem related to pairings, the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDH). After extending Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara's pairing based protocol to a slightly more general setting, we show that breaking the system is polynomially equivalent to solving BDH in the random oracle model and thus establish a security proof.