Virtual private networks
Framework for Testing the Fault-Tolerance of Systems Including OS and Network Aspects
HASE '01 The 6th IEEE International Symposium on High-Assurance Systems Engineering: Special Topic: Impact of Networking
Xen and the art of virtualization
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
ReVirt: enabling intrusion analysis through virtual-machine logging and replay
OSDI '02 Proceedings of the 5th symposium on Operating systems design and implementationCopyright restrictions prevent ACM from being able to make the PDFs for this conference available for downloading
A high-efficient inter-domain data transferring system for virtual machines
Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication
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Logging data is a valuable and an important information to reveal the attacker's activities and to recover broken system. Unfortunately, once the attacker successfully penetrates a protected system, he never fails to either modify the logging data, or even worse, delete them to cover his traces. To avoid such a disaster, it is best to keep logging data in another machine by forwarding them to a central logging server. However, this approach has a flaw: while transmitting on network, the data could be illegally sniffed or the traffic might be secretly redirected to a malicious machine. This paper proposes a novel method named Xenlog to secure logging data for systems run on Xen virtual machine: the solution does not use network stack to send data. Experimental and resulted tool proves that this approach is more secure than the traditional solution, while logging process is far more effective (nearly 21 times faster) and more reliable.