Hierarchical game and bi-level optimization for controlling network usage via pricing
NET-COOP'07 Proceedings of the 1st EuroFGI international conference on Network control and optimization
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Nowadays, third Generation (3G) wireless systems are becoming very populal: Direct-sequence code-division multiple-access (DS-CDMA) is implemented in these systems but, due to a limited radio spectrum and the growing number of demanding applications, it seems likely that congestion will still remain an issue. Pricing appears as a simple way to tackle this problem. This paper studies the impact of a per-packet static pricing scheme on the use of the reverse-link in a cell, where demand (de$ned through the so-called utility functions) decreases when prices increase or quality of service decreases. Since DS-CDMA supports integrated services, we also deal with pricing of multiple classes. In ajrst step, we determine as a Nash equilibrium the number of customers that will actually apply for service, depending on demand. In a second step, assuming pe$ect power control, we jind the prices and received powers optimizing the service provider's revenue. We find that in the case where potential demand always exceeds capacity, the base station's best interest is to favor only one class, but that is not the case in a realistic situation when considering potential demand as a random variable over time.