RSA-based verifiable and recoverable encryption of signatures and its application in certified e-mail delivery

  • Authors:
  • Aleksandra Nenadić;Ning Zhang;Qi Shi

  • Affiliations:
  • School of Computer Science, University of Manchester, UK;School of Computer Science, University of Manchester, UK;School of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, Liverpool John Moores University, UK

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on security track at ACM symposium on applied computing 2004
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

This paper presents two variant protocols RSA-CEMDI and RDA-CEMD2 for certified e-mail delivery with RSA receipts. The protocols provide non-repudiation of origin and non-repudiation of receipt security services to protect communicating parties from each other's false denials that the e-mail message has been sent and received. The protocols also provide strong fairness to ensure that the recipient receives the e-mail if and only if the sender receives the receipt. Services of an off-time and transparent third party are invoked in the protocols only in exceptional circumstances, i.e.. when the communicating parties fail to complete the e-mail for receipt exchange due to a network failure or a party's misbehaviour. Protocol RSA-CEMDI also offers confidentiality protection for the e-mail message and the corresponding receipt from the third party, achieved at the cost of some additional computations. The protocols are based on a cryptographic primitive called Verifiable and Recoverable Encryption of a Signature (VRES). The novel design of the VRES allows efficiency improvements in comparison with the related certified e-mail delivery protocols based on similar primitives.