Why Value Is Everything: A User-Centered Approach to Internet Quality of Service and Pricing
IWQoS '01 Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Quality of Service
User-Centric Performance Analysis of Market-Based Cluster Batch Schedulers
CCGRID '02 Proceedings of the 2nd IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid
The effect of latency on user performance in Warcraft III
NetGames '03 Proceedings of the 2nd workshop on Network and system support for games
The effects of loss and latency on user performance in unreal tournament 2003®
Proceedings of 3rd ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Network and system support for games
A service architecture for ATM: from applications to scheduling
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
Implementing and testing dynamic timeout adjustment as a dos counter-measure
Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Quality of protection
SWOON: a testbed for secure wireless overlay networks
CSET'08 Proceedings of the conference on Cyber security experimentation and test
One-way queuing delay measurement and its application on detecting DDoS attack
Journal of Network and Computer Applications
Towards lightweight and efficient DDOS attacks detection for web server
Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web
An economical model for the risk evaluation of DoS vulnerabilities in cryptography protocols
ISPEC'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Information security practice and experience
Queue management as a DoS counter-measure?
ISC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Information Security
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Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks significantly degrade service quality experienced by legitimate users, by introducing large delays, excessive losses, and service interruptions. The main goal of DoS defenses is to neutralize this effect, and to quickly and fully restore quality of various services to levels acceptable by the users. To objectively evaluate a variety of proposed defenses we must be able to precisely measure damage created by an attack, i.e., the denial of service itself, in controlled testbed experiments. Current evaluation methodologies measure DoS damage superficially and partially by measuring a single traffic parameter, such as duration, loss or throughput, and showing divergence during the attack from the baseline case. These measures do not consider quality-of-service requirements of different applications and how they map into specific thresholds for various traffic parameters. They thus fail to measure the service quality experienced by the end users.We propose a series of DoS impact metrics that are derived from traffic traces gathered at the source and the destination networks. We segment a trace into higher-level user tasks, called transactions, that require a certain service quality to satisfy users' expectations. Each transaction is classified into one of several proposed application categories, and we define quality-of-service (QoS) requirements for each category via thresholds imposed on several traffic parameters. We measure DoS impact as a percentage of transactions that have not met their QoS requirements and aggregate this measure into several metrics that expose the level of service denial. We evaluate the proposed metrics on a series of experiments with a wide range of background traffic and our results show that our metrics capture the DoS impact more precisely then partial measures used in the past.