Probabilistic latent semantic indexing
Proceedings of the 22nd annual international ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in information retrieval
Managing gigabytes (2nd ed.): compressing and indexing documents and images
Managing gigabytes (2nd ed.): compressing and indexing documents and images
Fossilized index: the linchpin of trustworthy non-alterable electronic records
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data
Named entity recognition: a maximum entropy approach using global information
COLING '02 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Computational linguistics - Volume 1
Named entity recognition using an HMM-based chunk tagger
ACL '02 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Meeting on Association for Computational Linguistics
Named Entity Extraction using AdaBoost
COLING-02 proceedings of the 6th conference on Natural language learning - Volume 20
Named entity recognition as a house of cards: classifier stacking
COLING-02 proceedings of the 6th conference on Natural language learning - Volume 20
Trustworthy keyword search for regulatory-compliant records retention
VLDB '06 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Very large data bases
Secure deletion for a versioning file system
FAST'05 Proceedings of the 4th conference on USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies - Volume 4
Deleting index entries from compliance storage
EDBT '08 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Extending database technology: Advances in database technology
Requirements of secure storage systems for healthcare records
SDM'07 Proceedings of the 4th VLDB conference on Secure data management
WORM-SEAL: trustworthy data retention and verification for regulatory compliance
ESORICS'09 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Research in computer security
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer & communications security
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Recent litigation and intense regulatory focus on secure retention of electronic records have spurred a rush to introduce Write-Once-Read-Many (WORM) storage devices for retaining business records such as electronic mail. A file committed to a WORM device cannot be deleted even by a super-user and hence is secure from attacks originating from company insiders. Secure retention, however, is only a part of a document's lifecycle: It is often crucial to delete documents after its mandatory retention period is over. Since most of the modern WORM devices are built on top of magnetic media, they also support a secure deletion operation by associating expiration time with files. However, for the deleted document to be truly unrecoverable, it must also be deleted from any index structure built over it.This paper studies the problem of securely deleting entries from an inverted index. We first formalize the concept of secure deletion by defining two deletion semantics: strongly and weakly secure deletions. We then analyze some of the deletion schemes that have been proposed in literature and show that they only achieve weakly secure deletion. Furthermore, such schemes have poor space efficiency and/or are inflexibe. We then propose a novel technique for hiding index entries for deleted documents, based on the concept of ambiguating deleted entries. The proposed technique also achieves weakly secure deletion, but is more space efficient and flexible.