Causality: models, reasoning, and inference
Causality: models, reasoning, and inference
The size distribution for Markov equivalence classes of acyclic digraph models
Artificial Intelligence
Bayesian Nets And Causality: Philosophical And Computational Foundations
Bayesian Nets And Causality: Philosophical And Computational Foundations
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I put forward several desiderata that a philosophical theory of causality should satisfy: it should account for the objectivity of causality, it should underpin formalisms for causal reasoning, it should admit a viable epistemology, it should be able to cope with the great variety of causal claims that are made, and it should be ontologically parsimonious. I argue that Nancy Cartwright's dispositional account of causality goes part way towards meeting these criteria but is lacking in important respects. I go on to argue that my epistemic account, which ties causal relationships to an agent's knowledge and ignorance, performs well in the light of the desiderata. Such an account, I claim, is all we require from a theory of causality.