Counterexamples to a likelihood theory of evidence

  • Authors:
  • Malcolm R. Forster

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, USA 53706

  • Venue:
  • Minds and Machines
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

The likelihood theory of evidence (LTE) says, roughly, that all the information relevant to the bearing of data on hypotheses (or models) is contained in the likelihoods. There exist counterexamples in which one can tell which of two hypotheses is true from the full data, but not from the likelihoods alone. These examples suggest that some forms of scientific reasoning, such as the consilience of inductions (Whewell, 1858. In Novum organon renovatum (Part II of the 3rd ed.). The philosophy of the inductive sciences. London: Cass, 1967), cannot be represented within Bayesian and Likelihoodist philosophies of science.