Hyper-Contradictions, Generalized Truth Values and Logics of Truth and Falsehood

  • Authors:

  • Yaroslav Shramko;Heinrich Wansing

  • Affiliations:

  • Department of Philosophy, State Pedagogical University, Krivoi Rog, Ukraine 50086;Institute of Philosophy, Dresden University of Technology, Dresden, Germany 01062

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Logic, Language and Information
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

In Philosophical Logic, the Liar Paradox has been used to motivate the introduction of both truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Moreover, in the light of "revenge Liar" arguments, also higher-order combinations of generalized truth values have been suggested to account for so-called hyper-contradictions. In the present paper, Graham Priest's treatment of generalized truth values is scrutinized and compared with another strategy of generalizing the set of classical truth values and defining an entailment relation on the resulting sets of higher-order values. This method is based on the concept of a multilattice. If the method is applied to the set of truth values of Belnap's "useful four-valued logic", one obtains a trilattice, and, more generally, structures here called Belnap-trilattices. As in Priest's case, it is shown that the generalized truth values motivated by hyper-contradictions have no effect on the logic. Whereas Priest's construction in terms of designated truth values always results in his Logic of Paradox, the present construction in terms of truth and falsity orderings always results in First Degree Entailment. However, it is observed that applying the multilattice-approach to Priest's initial set of truth values leads to an interesting algebraic structure of a "bi-and-a-half" lattice which determines seven-valued logics different from Priest's Logic of Paradox.