Low-rate TCP-targeted denial of service attacks and counter strategies

  • Authors:
  • Aleksandar Kuzmanovic;Edward W. Knightly

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Rice University, Houston, TX

  • Venue:
  • IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

Denial of Service attacks are presenting an increasing threat to the global inter-networking infrastructure. While TCP's congestion control algorithm is highly robust to diverse network conditions, its implicit assumption of end-system cooperation results in a well-known vulnerability to attack by high-rate non-responsive flows. In this paper, we investigate a class of low-rate denial of service attacks which, unlike high-rate attacks, are difficult for routers and counter-DoS mechanisms to detect. Using a combination of analytical modeling, simulations, and Internet experiments, we show that maliciously chosen low-rate DoS traffic patterns that exploit TCP's retransmission timeout mechanism can throttle TCP flows to a small fraction of their ideal rate while eluding detection. Moreover, as such attacks exploit protocol homogeneity, we study fundamental limits of the ability of a class of randomized timeout mechanisms to thwart such low-rate DoS attacks.