The active badge location system
ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS)
The anatomy of a context-aware application
MobiCom '99 Proceedings of the 5th annual ACM/IEEE international conference on Mobile computing and networking
The Cricket location-support system
MobiCom '00 Proceedings of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Secure communications over insecure channels
Communications of the ACM
Project Aura: Toward Distraction-Free Pervasive Computing
IEEE Pervasive Computing
Robust Positioning Algorithms for Distributed Ad-Hoc Wireless Sensor Networks
ATEC '02 Proceedings of the General Track of the annual conference on USENIX Annual Technical Conference
Real 802.11 Security: Wi-Fi Protected Access and 802.11i
Real 802.11 Security: Wi-Fi Protected Access and 802.11i
MobiCom poster: secure spaces: location-based secure wireless group communication
ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review
Secure verification of location claims
WiSe '03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Localization in sensor networks
Wireless sensor networks
The limits of localization using RSS
SenSys '04 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Embedded networked sensor systems
The Horus WLAN location determination system
Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
Perspective/navigation-The Global Positioning System
IEEE Spectrum
New directions in cryptography
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Kerberos: an authentication service for computer networks
IEEE Communications Magazine
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This paper addresses the cryptographic key exchange problem in a wireless network. An infrastructure-based wireless network such as a Wireless LAN is considered. An indoor wireless locationing system, based on a collection of beacon nodes, is assumed to be present. The proposed technique makes use of ranging information between nodes to establish a shared secret key between security principals. The key exchange technique is based on the notion of symmetric ranging combined with Merkle's puzzles. This technique is independent of any underlying encryption algorithm. The system's security properties, in terms of the time to obtain the secret key and the time for an adversary to break the key, are analyzed using empirical implementations. The results show that the secret key can be established in five seconds between the principals, while it requires the adversary two orders of magnitude more time in some cases to substantially more than an hour (when the implementation times out) in most cases.