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Strong password-only authenticated key exchange
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Intercepting mobile communications: the insecurity of 802.11
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DoS and authentication in wireless public access networks
WiSE '02 Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Wireless security
Efficient, DoS-resistant, secure key exchange for internet protocols
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
More Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Network layer access control for context-aware IPv6 applications
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LCN '01 Proceedings of the 26th Annual IEEE Conference on Local Computer Networks
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SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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SSYM'96 Proceedings of the 6th conference on USENIX Security Symposium, Focusing on Applications of Cryptography - Volume 6
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IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In this paper we study two access control protocols which have similar two-layer access control architectures for wireless networks in public places. The first protocol, called the Lancaster protocol, employs user password for authentication and enforces access control at the IP layer; while the second protocol, referred to as the Stanford protocol, uses public key cryptosystems (PKC) for authentication and performs access control at the link layer. Although both protocols are intended to restrict access to wireless networks only to authorized users, our analysis shows that both protocols have serious security flaws which make them vulnerable to attacks. Then we propose a password-based protocol and a PKC-based protocol for the Lancaster architecture and the Stanford architecture, respectively. Both of our protocols provide mutual authentication, perfect forward secrecy and access control for wireless networks. Moreover, they also provide DoS resistance and identity confidentiality for the client. We present detailed security and performance analysis for our protocols, and show that both of our protocols are secure and efficient for access control in wireless networks.