A formal analysis of information disclosure in data exchange

  • Authors:
  • Gerome Miklau;Dan Suciu

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 140 Governors Drive, Amherst, MA 01003, USA;Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Washington, Box 352350, Seattle, WA 98195, USA

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Computer and System Sciences
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We perform a theoretical study of the following query-view security problem: given a view V to be published, does V logically disclose information about a confidential query S? The problem is motivated by the need to manage the risk of unintended information disclosure in today's world of universal data exchange. We present a novel information-theoretic standard for query-view security. This criterion can be used to provide a precise analysis of information disclosure for a host of data exchange scenarios, including multi-party collusion and the use of outside knowledge by an adversary trying to learn privileged facts about the database. We prove a number of theoretical results for deciding security according to this standard. We also generalize our security criterion to account for prior knowledge a user or adversary may possess, and introduce techniques for measuring the magnitude of partial disclosures. We believe these results can be a foundation for practical efforts to secure data exchange frameworks, and also illuminate a nice interaction between logic and probability theory.