Insider attacks on multi-proxy multi-signature schemes

  • Authors:
  • Lifeng Guo;Guilin Wang

  • Affiliations:
  • State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;Institute for Infocomm Research, 21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore 119613, Singapore

  • Venue:
  • Computers and Electrical Engineering
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In 2004, Hwang and Chen demonstrated new multi-proxy multi-signature schemes that allow a group of authorized proxy signers to sign messages on behalf of a group of original signers. Later, Lyuu and Wu pointed out Hwang et al.'s schemes were not secure and then proposed a modified scheme. They claimed that their modified schemes were secure. But in this paper we show a new attack on the Lyuu-Wu et al.'s schemes. Moreover, the original Hwang-Chen's schemes are also vulnerable to this insider attack. Furthermore, we point out some improvements for the Lyuu-Wu scheme and Hwang-Chen schemes according to Wang et al.'s methods [Wang GL, Han XX, Zhu B. On the security of two threshold signature schemes with traceable signers. In: Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS 2003). Lect Notes Comput Sci (LNCS), vol. 2846, Springer-Verlag; 2003. p. 111-222]. These improvements can resist our insider attack.