A survey of the theory of coherent lower previsions
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Imprecise probability trees: Bridging two theories of imprecise probability
Artificial Intelligence
Financial risk measurement with imprecise probabilities
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
Representation insensitivity in immediate prediction under exchangeability
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Updating coherent previsions on finite spaces
Fuzzy Sets and Systems
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Epistemic irrelevance in credal nets: The case of imprecise Markov trees
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Probability boxes on totally preordered spaces for multivariate modelling
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
A logical characterization of coherence for imprecise probabilities
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Notes on desirability and conditional lower previsions
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Generalizing inference rules in a coherence-based probabilistic default reasoning
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Exchangeability and sets of desirable gambles
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Forecasting with imprecise probabilities
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Bruno de Finetti and imprecision: Imprecise probability does not exist!
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Conglomerable natural extension
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Irrelevant and independent natural extension for sets of desirable gambles
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Independence and 2-monotonicity: Nice to have, hard to keep
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Artificial Intelligence
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
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The personalist conception of probability is often explicated in terms of betting rates acceptable to an individual. A common approach, that of de Finetti for example, assumes that the individual is willing to take either side of the bet, so that the bet is ''fair'' from the individual's point of view. This can sometimes be unrealistic, and leads to difficulties in the case of conditional probabilities or previsions. An alternative conception is presented in which it is only assumed that the collection of acceptable bets forms a convex cone, rather than a linear space. This leads to the more general conception of an upper conditional prevision. The main concerns of the paper are with the extension of upper conditional previsions. The main result is that any upper conditional prevision is the upper envelope of a family of additive conditional previsions.