Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption

  • Authors:
  • Joonsang Baek;Ron Steinfeld;Yuliang Zheng

  • Affiliations:
  • Institute for Infocomm Research, 21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore 119613, Singapore;Department of Computing, Macquarie University, North Ryde, NSW 2109, Australia;Department of Software and Information Systems, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC 28223, USA

  • Venue:
  • Journal of Cryptology
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Signcryption is an asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a low computational and communication overhead. In this paper we propose realistic security models for signcryption, which give the attacker power to choose both messages/signcryptexts as well as recipient/sender public keys when accessing the signcryption/unsigncryption oracles of attacked entities. We then show that Zheng's original signcryption scheme is secure in our confidentiality model relative to the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem and is secure in our unforgeability model relative to a Gap version of the discrete logarithm problem. All these results are shown in the random oracle model.