On cheating in sealed-bid auctions
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Building trust in online auction markets through an economic incentive mechanism
Decision Support Systems
Shill Bidding In Multi-Round Online Auctions
HICSS '02 Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'02)-Volume
Running up the bid: detecting, predicting, and preventing reserve price shilling in online auctions
ICEC '03 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce
Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue Maximising Agendas for Sequential English Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Internet Auction Fraud Detection Using Social Network Analysis and Classification Tree Approaches
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Price comparison: A reliable approach to identifying shill bidding in online auctions?
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Survey: Combating online in-auction fraud: Clues, techniques and challenges
Computer Science Review
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Action frauds constitute largest part of all Internet frauds. Cheating is a kind of fraud that does not have direct evidences of its occurrence. We conduct theoretical studies as well as simulation experiments to find out the effect of cheating in three important types of auctions: English auction, first-price sealed-bid, and second-price sealed-bid auction. Our cheating environment consists of shill bidding, bid shading and false bidding in English, first-price and second-price auction, respectively. In the experiments ordinary bidders, bidders with the equilibrium bidding strategy, and cheaters compete with each other. Both theoretical and experimental results confirm that the equilibrium bidding strategies indeed increases the bidders' expected utility. Therefore, it can be concluded that adoption of rational bidding strategies can combat cheating. It is found that most of the auction sites intuitively prefer English auction to other auction mechanisms. There is not much theoretical or experimental evidence to support such an intuition. We use honest bidder's expected gain and honest seller's revenue loss as a basis to compare these three important auctions types. The analysis of the results reveals English auction to be the most preferred mechanism from both honest buyer's and honest seller's point of view. This result can be used as an experimental evidence to explain the popularity of English auction over the Internet.