A General Framework for the Study of Decentralized Distribution Systems
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
A Two-Location Inventory Model with Transshipment and Local Decision Making
Management Science
A New Decision Rule for Lateral Transshipments in Inventory Systems
Management Science
A Three-Stage Model for a Decentralized Distribution System of Retailers
Operations Research
Who Benefits from Transshipment? Exogenous vs. Endogenous Wholesale Prices
Management Science
Formation of Alliances in Internet-Based Supply Exchanges
Management Science
Inventory Sharing and Rationing in Decentralized Dealer Networks
Management Science
Stable Farsighted Coalitions in Competitive Markets
Management Science
Optimal Policies for Transshipping Inventory in a Retail Network
Management Science
Transshipment and Its Impact on Supply Chain Members' Performance
Management Science
A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
Management Science
Stable Farsighted Coalitions in Competitive Markets
Management Science
Coalition Stability in Assembly Models
Operations Research
Global Facility Network Design with Transshipment and Responsive Pricing
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Transshipment prices and pair-wise stability in coordinating the decentralized transshipment problem
Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions
Alliance Formation Among Perfectly Complementary Suppliers in a Price-Sensitive Assembly System
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Centralizing Inventory in Supply Chains by Using Shapley Value to Allocate the Profits
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Incentives for Transshipment in a Supply Chain with Decentralized Retailers
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
In-Season Transshipments Among Competitive Retailers
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Large-Scale Service Marketplaces: The Role of the Moderating Firm
Management Science
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The author considers a model of a decentralized distribution system consisting of n retailers selling an identical product. Retailers face a stochastic demand and must order their initial inventory before this demand is realized. After demand realization, retailers decide how much of their unsold inventory or unsatisfied demand they want to share with other retailers. This is followed by a transshipment of leftover inventories and distribution of the additional profit generated through inventory sharing. The author addresses the following issue: Suppose that the retailers distribute the profit from inventory sharing according to an allocation rule that induces retailers to share their residuals in a way that maximizes the additional profit, such as the Shapley value, but may not belong to the core. Is it likely that, in this framework, all retailers will jointly share their residuals and not form subcoalitions? Previous research has looked at this problem from a myopic viewpoint and concluded that the grand coalition is not stable. Unlike the prior work, the author looks at stability in a farsighted sense. That is, retailers do not consider only their immediate payoffs but are also concerned with reactions of other retailers to their actions. In a symmetric setting, with identical additional unit revenues from transshipments generated by all retailers, farsighted retailers always maximize their allocations by not defecting from the grand coalition. The author also provides conditions when the same is true for nonidentical additional unit revenues.