Child-proof authentication for MIPv6 (CAM)
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Improved topology assumptions for threshold cryptography in mobile ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Securing reliable server pooling in MANET against byzantine adversaries
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IEEE Network: The Magazine of Global Internetworking
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Designing secure protocols over ad-hoc networks has proved to be a very challenging task, due to various features of such networks, such as partial connectivity, node mobility, and resource constraints. Furthermore, their lack of physical infrastructures deprives their users of even basic network functions such as message routing, for which nodes are themselves responsible. In this paper we consider a very basic network function, node discovery, in ad-hoc networks, where a node with limited network information would like to establish a session with a given number of other nodes in the network (of which the node may not be aware about). We formally define correctness, security and efficiency properties of node discovery protocols, and investigate the problem of designing such protocols under appropriate network topology assumptions. Here, the security of these protocols is against Byzantine adversaries that can corrupt up to a limited number of nodes in the network and make them arbitrarily deviate from their protocol. After presenting some secure node discovery protocols, we show their application to secure service architectures in ad-hoc networks.