STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The dining cryptographers problem: unconditional sender and recipient untraceability
Journal of Cryptology
Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability in spite of active attacks
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Detection of disrupters in the DC protocol
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Cryptographic defense against traffic analysis
STOC '93 Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Efficient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Simplified VSS and fast-track multiparty computations with applications to threshold cryptography
PODC '98 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Communications of the ACM
Anonymous Web transactions with Crowds
Communications of the ACM
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Traffic analysis: protocols, attacks, design issues, and open problems
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
The disadvantages of free MIX routes and how to overcome them
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Communication Networks: Fundamental Concepts and Key Architectures
Communication Networks: Fundamental Concepts and Key Architectures
Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems
IHW '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Information Hiding
SNDSS '96 Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS '96)
Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol
SP '03 Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Millimix: Mixing in Small Batches
Millimix: Mixing in Small Batches
Efficient multiparty computations secure against an adaptive adversary
EUROCRYPT'99 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
How to break a practical MIX and design a new one
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Breaking four mix-related schemes based on universal re-encryption
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
Anonymous communication with on-line and off-line onion encoding
SOFSEM'05 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Theory and Practice of Computer Science
An improved construction for universal re-encryption
PET'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Some remarks on universal re-encryption and a novel practical anonymous tunnel
ICCNMC'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Networking and Mobile Computing
Onions based on universal re-encryption – anonymous communication immune against repetitive attack
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
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With the growth and acceptance of the Internet, there has been increased interest in maintaining anonymity in the network. By using traffic analysis, it is possible to infer who is talking to whom over the Internet. We present a novel approach to hide the senders and the receivers of messages. Routes are chosen and frames traverse these routes. Each frame consists of a token and a node can send a message through a frame only when the corresponding token is free. The advantage of our protocol is that it poses limited bandwidth overhead when there is at least some traffic, while posing minimal bandwidth overhead when there is no traffic at all.