Using nash implementation to achieve better frugality ratios
ISAAC'07 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Algorithms and computation
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This dissertation studies mechanism design for various combinatorial problems in the presence of strategic agents. A mechanism is an algorithm for allocating a resource among a group of participants, each of which has a privately-known value for any particular allocation. A mechanism is truthful if it is in each participant's best interest to reveal his private information truthfully regardless of the strategies of the other participants. First, we explore a competitive auction framework for truthful mechanism design in the setting of multi-unit auctions, or auctions which sell multiple identical copies of a good. In this framework, the goal is to design a truthful auction whose revenue approximates that of an omniscient auction for any set of bids. We focus on two natural settings---the limited demand setting where bidders desire at most a fixed number of copies and the limited budget setting where bidders can spend at most a fixed amount of money. In the limit demand setting, all prior auctions employed the use of randomization in the computation of the allocation and prices. Randomization in truthful mechanism design is undesirable because, in arguing the truthfulness of the mechanism, we employ an underlying assumption that the bidders trust the random coin flips of the auctioneer. Next, we consider abandoning truthfulness in order to improve the revenue properties of procurement auctions, or auctions that are used to hire a team of agents to complete a task. We study first-price procurement auctions and their variants and argue that in certain settings the payment is never significantly more than, and sometimes much less than, truthful mechanisms. Then we consider the setting of cost-sharing auctions. In a cost-sharing auction, agents bid to receive some service, such as connectivity to the internet. A subset of agents is then selected for service and charged prices to approximately recover the cost of servicing them. We ask what can be achieved by cost-sharing auctions satisfying a strengthening of truthfulness called group-strategyproofness. Finally, we study centralized two-sided markets, or markets that form a matching between participants based on preference lists. (Copies available exclusively from MIT Libraries, Rm. 14-0551, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307. Ph. 617-253-5668; Fax 617-253-1690.) (Abstract shortened by UMI.)