Attacking a public key cryptosystem based on tree replacement

  • Authors:
  • María Isabel González Vasco;David Pérez García

  • Affiliations:
  • Departamento de Matemática Aplicada, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Móstoles, Madrid, Spain;Departamento de Matemática Aplicada, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Móstoles, Madrid, Spain

  • Venue:
  • Discrete Applied Mathematics
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

We point out several security flaws in the cryptosystem based on tree replacement systems proposed by Samuel, Thomas, Abisha and Subramanian at INDOCRYPT 2002. Due to the success of (among others) very simple ciphertext-only attacks, we evidence that this system does not, in its present form, offer acceptable security guarantees for cryptographic applications.