A model of new product development: an empirical test
Management Science
The capability maturity model: guidelines for improving the software process
The capability maturity model: guidelines for improving the software process
New product development: the performance and time-to-market tradeoff
Management Science
Management Science - Special issue on frontier research in manufacturing and logistics
A field study of scale economies in software maintenance
Management Science - Special issue: Frontier research on information systems and economics
An Empirical Analysis of Productivity and Quality in Software Products
Management Science
Comparison of Software Quality Under Perpetual Licensing and Software as a Service
Journal of Management Information Systems
Information Security: Facilitating User Precautions Vis-à-Vis Enforcement Against Attackers
Journal of Management Information Systems
An Economic Analysis of the Software Market with a Risk-Sharing Mechanism
International Journal of Electronic Commerce
Information Systems Research
Journal of Systems and Software
A systematic literature review of software quality cost research
Journal of Systems and Software
Are markets for vulnerabilities effective?
MIS Quarterly
Patch Release Behaviors of Software Vendors in Response to Vulnerabilities: An Empirical Analysis
Journal of Management Information Systems
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We present a model of fixing or patching a software problem after the product has been released in the market. Specifically, we model a software firms trade-off in releasing a buggy product early and investments in fixing it later. Just as the marginal cost of producing software can be effectively zero, so can the marginal cost of repairing multiple copies of defective software by issuing patches. We show that due to the fixed cost nature of investments in patching, a software vendor has incentives to release a buggier product early and patch it later in a larger market. Thus, a software monopolist releases a product with fewer bugs but later than what is socially optimal. We contrast this result with physical good markets where market size does not play any role in quality provision. We also show that for comparable costs, a software monopolist releases the product with more bugs but invests more in post-patching support later than the physical good monopolist.