The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning

Authors:
H. Peyton Young
Affiliations:
Johns Hopkins University, USA and University of Oxford, UK and The Brookings Institution, USA
Venue:
Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2007

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Abstract

This paper surveys recent work on learning in games and delineates the boundary between forms of learning that lead to Nash equilibrium, and forms that lead to weaker notions of equilibrium or to none at all.