Efficient verifier-based password-authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting

  • Authors:
  • Jeong Ok Kwon;Ik Rae Jeong;Kouichi Sakurai;Dong Hoon Lee

  • Affiliations:
  • Graduate School of Information Security CIST, Korea university, 1, 5-Ka, Anam-dong Sungbuk-ku, Seoul, 136-701 Korea;ETRI (Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute) 161 Gajeong-dong, Yuseoung-Gu, Daejeon, 305-700 Korea;Department of Computer Science and Communication Engineering, Kyushu University 6-10-1 Hakozaki, Higashi-ku, Fukuoka, 812-0053 Japan;Graduate School of Information Security CIST, Korea university, 1, 5-Ka, Anam-dong Sungbuk-ku, Seoul, 136-701 Korea

  • Venue:
  • Computer Standards & Interfaces
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

In the last few years, researchers have extensively studied the password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) in the three-party setting. The fundamental security goal of PAKE is security against dictionary attacks. The protocols for verifier-based PAKE are additionally required to be secure against server compromise. Some verifier-based PAKE schemes in the three-party setting have been suggested to solve the server compromise problem. Unfortunately, the protocols are vulnerable to an off-line dictionary attack. In this paper, we present an efficient verifier-based PAKE protocol for three-parties that is secure against known-key attacks and provides forward secrecy. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed protocol is the first secure three-party verifier-based PAKE protocol in the literature.