Building a high-performance, programmable secure coprocessor
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking - Special issue on computer network security
Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant software
ASPLOS IX Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Architectural support for programming languages and operating systems
AEGIS: architecture for tamper-evident and tamper-resistant processing
ICS '03 Proceedings of the 17th annual international conference on Supercomputing
Controlled Physical Random Functions
ACSAC '02 Proceedings of the 18th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
How to build a trusted database system on untrusted storage
OSDI'00 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Symposium on Operating System Design & Implementation - Volume 4
ChipLock: support for secure microarchitectures
ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News - Special issue: Workshop on architectural support for security and anti-virus (WASSA)
Symmetric behavior-based trust: a new paradigm for internet computing
NSPW '04 Proceedings of the 2004 workshop on New security paradigms
Pioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems
Proceedings of the twentieth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Speculative virtual verification: policy-constrained speculative execution
NSPW '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on New security paradigms
Simplifying cyber foraging for mobile devices
Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Mobile systems, applications and services
Semantic remote attestation: a virtual machine directed approach to trusted computing
VM'04 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Virtual Machine Research And Technology Symposium - Volume 3
Daonity - Grid security from two levels of virtualization
Information Security Tech. Report
On the difficulty of validating voting machine software with software
EVT'07 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Accurate Electronic Voting Technology
Using hypervisor to provide data secrecy for user applications on a per-page basis
Proceedings of the fourth ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS international conference on Virtual execution environments
Flicker: an execution infrastructure for tcb minimization
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM SIGOPS/EuroSys European Conference on Computer Systems 2008
A hypervisor-based system for protecting software runtime memory and persistent storage
Proceedings of the 2008 Spring simulation multiconference
Serviter: A service-oriented programmable network platform for shared infrastructure
Computer Communications
Effective implementation of the cell broadband engine™ isolation loader
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Detecting code alteration by creating a temporary memory bottleneck
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security - Special issue on electronic voting
Mitigating the lying-endpoint problem in virtualized network access frameworks
DSOM'07 Proceedings of the Distributed systems: operations and management 18th IFIP/IEEE international conference on Managing virtualization of networks and services
Conqueror: tamper-proof code execution on legacy systems
DIMVA'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Detection of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment
T-DRE: a hardware trusted computing base for direct recording electronic vote machines
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
On device identity establishment and verification
EuroPKI'09 Proceedings of the 6th European conference on Public key infrastructures, services and applications
Trust extension as a mechanism for secure code execution on commodity computers
Trust extension as a mechanism for secure code execution on commodity computers
FORTUNA-A framework for the design and development of hardware-based secure systems
Journal of Systems and Software
Memory encryption: A survey of existing techniques
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
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Cerium is a trusted computing architecture that protects a program's execution from being tampered while the program is running. Cerium uses a physically tamper-resistant CPU and a µ-kernel to protect programs from each other and from hardware attacks. The µ-kernel partitions programs into separate address spaces, and the CPU applies memory protection to ensure that programs can only use their own data; the CPU traps to the µ-kernel when loading or evicting a cache line, and the µ-kernel cryptographically authenticates and copy-protects each program's instructions and data when they are stored in the untrusted off-chip DRAM. The Cerium CPU signs certificates that securely identify the CPU and its manufacturer, the BIOS and boot loader, the µ-kernel, the running program, and any data the program wants signed. These certificates tell a user what program executed and what hardware and software environment surrounded the program, which are key facts in deciding whether to trust a program's output.