Network security: private communication in a public world
Network security: private communication in a public world
Strong password-only authenticated key exchange
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Server-Assisted Generation of a Strong Secret from a Password
WETICE '00 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
Extended Password Key Exchange Protocols Immune to Dictionary Attacks
WET-ICE '97 Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Enabling Technologies on Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises
Number theoretic attacks on secure password schemes
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Password Authentication Using Multiple Servers
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Password authenticated key exchange using hidden smooth subgroups
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Improved proxy re-encryption schemes with applications to secure distributed storage
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
ACSW '07 Proceedings of the fifth Australasian symposium on ACSW frontiers - Volume 68
Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Identity and trust on the Internet
A method for making password-based key exchange resilient to server compromise
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
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In this paper we present PDM (Password Derived Moduli), a new approach to strong password-based protocols usable either for mutual authentication or for downloading security information such as the user's private key. We describe how the properties desirable for strong password mutual authentication differ from the properties desirable for credentials download. In particular, a protocol used solely for credentials download can be simpler and less expensive than one used for mutual authentication since some properties (such as authentication of the server) are not necessary for credentials download. The features necessary for mutual authentication can be easily added to a credentials download protocol, but many of the protocols designed for mutual authentication are not as desirable for use in credentials download as protocols like PDM and basic EKE and SPEKE because they are unnecessarily expensive when used for that purpose. PDM's performance is vastly more expensive at the client than any of the protocols in the literature, but it is more efficient at the server. We claim that performance at the server, since a server must handle a large and potentially unpredictable number of clients, is more important than performance at the client, assuming that client performance is "good enough". We describe PDM for credentials download, and then show how to enhance it to have the properties desirable for mutual authentication. In particular, the enhancement we advocate for allowing PDM to avoid storing a password-equivalent at the server is less expensive than existing schemes, and our approach can be used as a more efficient (at the server) variant of augmented EKE and SPEKE than the currently published schemes. PDM is important because it is a very different approach to the problem than any in the literature, we believe it to be unencumbered by patents, and because it can be a lot less expensive at the server than existing schemes.